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Abstract 
 
Today’s contemporary business world has incorporated Web Services and Web Applications in its core of operating cycle nowadays and 
security plays a major role in the amalgamation of such services and applications with the business needs worldwide. OWASP (Open 
Web Application Security Project) states that the effectiveness of security mechanisms in a Web Application can be estimated by evalu-
ating the degree of vulnerability against any of the nominated top ten vulnerabilities, nominated by the OWASP. This paper sheds light 
on a number of existing tools that can be used to test for the CSRF vulnerability. The main objective of the research is to identify the 
available solutions to prevent CSRF attacks. By analyzing the techniques employed in each of the solutions, the optimal tool can be iden-
tified. Tests against the exploitation of the vulnerabilities were conducted after implementing the solutions into the web application to 
check the efficacy of each of the solutions. The research also proposes a combined solution that integrates the passing of an unpredictable 
token through a hidden field and validating it on the server side with the passing of token through URL. 
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1. Introduction 
Securing information is a big challenge in web applications. A 
well-secured web application should never allow information to 
slip into the hands of an unauthorized user. In this modern era, 
information sharing over the Internet is every day’s business. 
Keeping the data secure means preventing misuse due to unau-
thorized access. But this task alone is becoming harder to achieve 
every day due to the easy transferability of digital information [1].  
Since Web Applications are widely used for both business and 
personal purposes, the security testing of such applications has a 
high importance. The primary benefit of using Web Applications 
in day-to-days business is that it makes the transactions considera-
bly faster without disruptions [2]. Unfortunately, no standardized 
testing methodologies have been developed yet to test the security 
of these applications [3]. The research by White Hat claims that 
over sixty percent (60%) of the total web applications are exposed 
to multiple vulnerabilities which any attacker can take advantage 
of. These statistics are quite worrisome and it goes without saying 
that this rate must come down markedly [4]. Suitable and robust 
security policies should be implemented during development of 
any Web Application. Web Applications require more attention 
than normal computer applications because they are much more 
sensitive and highly prone to online attacks. A security loophole 
or a weakness in a Web Application, which a hacker can misuse to 
carry out an attack, is known as vulnerability [5]. Vulnerabilities 
are generally classified into two groups: Technical and Logical.  
One of the best-known Web Application vulnerabilities is Cross 
Site Request Forgery (CSRF). The aim of this research is to ana-
lyze the different available tools for CSRF testing. The following 
section highlights the problem statement, followed by a compari-
son of the methods and in-depth analysis of the solutions available.  
On the basis of different tests and analysis, the most effective 
solution will be identified. 
CSRF is an attack that transpires when an attacker forces an au-
thenticated user of a Web Application to execute an unwanted 
operation in that application which results in exploiting the trust 
relation of a website. These attacks are known by many other 
names, such as Confused Deputy, One Click Attack, Sea Surf, 
Session Riding and XSRF [6]. 
Many Web Applications are not fully protected, especially against 
the CSRF vulnerability. Cross Site Request Forgery is one of the 
top 10 vulnerabilities selected by the OWASP and is ranked in the 
third in the sense of severity after SQL Injection and Cross Site 
Scripting [7]. Another interesting fact is that these attacks, if they 
are executed properly, can be very damaging for the Web Applica-
tions. The State Changing functionality remains the main focus of 
the attackers.  
These strikes, which are mainly aimed towards the users of a web 
application rather than the web application itself, intend to obtain 
the sensitive data of the users. They are commonly known as so-
cial engineering attacks [8]. Most developers believe that normal 
security measures, such as adding cookies with the requests, can 
prevent Web Applications from these attacks. Unfortunately, this 
solution is not effective enough because the hacker can get access 
to all the sessions related information with the aid of different 
technologies currently available. As a result, full protection for 
state changing functionalities in Web Applications is not available. 
The best solution for each application should be selected accord-
ing to the purpose of the application. This is the focus of this re-
search [9].  
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Enterprise applications which allow sharing the real time data over 
the internet have been introduced as a new medium to promote the 
growth of companies. To increase the security, a number of sub-
systems need to be installed to protect the data across the commu-
nication. Organizations should regularly adopt new technologies 
to enhance their data security and protect their highly sensitive 
data from unauthorized access. 
2. Cross Site Request Forgery Attacks 
CSRF is often referred as the “Sleeping Giant” among the critical 
vulnerabilities found in Web applications [10]. These attacks can 
often cause havoc because the developers and a testing squad of a 
website neglect them and fail to put the protective measures 
against these attacks in place. The academic and technical discus-
sions on these attacks are relatively limited and they have there-
fore not been a part of the threat classification of web security. 
Most web development companies take it for granted that when 
there is protection against Cross Site Scripting attacks, CSRFs are 
also prevented automatically. Unfortunately, numerous web de-
velopers are totally unaware that CSRF and XSS (Cross-Site 
Scripting) attacks are entirely different kinds of threats. Compared 
to other major attacks, CSRF is fairly easy to detect, exploit and 
prevent. The only requirement is that the developers should know 
how and where this attack happens. 
The CSRF attack is executed by bypassing a request through the 
user’s browser. The attacker misuses the user’s belief in a website. 
The policy of the browser which handles the security allows it to 
forge a request to any website without problems. This gives the 
hacker the opportunity to control the browser according to his or 
her wish. 
Even if the attacker is not able to send any request to the victim’s 
web application, because the attacker is beyond the firewall of the 
user, he or she can still make the user send the request from the 
user’s browser, which is in the firewall. Since each request carries 
the session information of the user, the attack will be successful 
even though the user is beyond the firewall [11]. 
An attacker to perform attacks varying in severity and target can 
use CSRF. The most popular type of attack is exploiting the valid 
session ID that a user has for a particular web application. Im-
proper protection against CSRF from the web application results 
in these types of attacks. Even if the applications of companies of 
market moving capacity are protected against CSRF, there are 
incidents which indicate the security gaps are still present. Alt-
hough CSRF attacks are popularly used to attack the Web Appli-
cations, hardware devices like printers, routers, switches etc. can 
also be compromised [12].  
Attackers have exploited the CSRF vulnerability in the recent past. 
This happens only because the developers of the Web Applica-
tions are not cautious enough to implement preventive measures 
against CSRF when they develop the applications. Attacks, which 
occurred in 2016 with the Belkin routers and Agora Wallet, are 
examples of such instance [13, 14]. 
3. Critical Factors for a Successful Attack 
The first and foremost condition for a CSRF attack to be success-
ful is that the user should be authenticated to the victim’s website. 
The next step is to provoke the client to visit the malicious website. 
This can be the attacker’s own website or a website which is under 
the control of the attacker [15]. If the server of a website is vulner-
able to CSRF and it accepts the GET request, the attack becomes 
much easier. The attacker can use a simple image tag to perform 
the operation. In the case of the POST requests, the image tag 
would not work but the attack could still be carried out with the 
help of a simple code in JavaScript that can be used to submit the 
FORM tag automatically [16]. 
The ranking of CSRF in OWASP top 10 vulnerabilities proves 
that the attack is still critical and the need for an effective solution 
is still a top priority. The threat classification released by the Web 
Application Security Consortium ranks CSRF 9th in the list of 
critical vulnerabilities [11].  
The authentication methods of the Grid registering stage accept 
different security approaches. The general concept of resource 
centralization and authorization management does not fit into the 
concept of Service Oriented Architectures [11].  
4. Comparison of CSRF Testing Tools 
This section describes the criteria we use for comparison of the 
CSRF testing. 
4.1. Creation of CSRF HTML File 
For testing, we need to create an HTML file which contains the 
CSRF attack code. This HTML file can either be generated manu-
ally by the tester or with the help of a tool.  
4.2. Proxy Listening 
Proxy listening is the process of recording each and every request 
sent by the browser to the web applications. The tester cannot do 
this manually and hence requires the help of a tool.  There are 
tools which can block the request and ask for confirmation from 
the tool to forward the request to the web application.   
4.3. Auto Submission of Forms 
The auto submission of the forms in the POST requests can be 
done with the help of JavaScript codes. The tester can create this 
code with the help of a tool or can make it manually. 
4.4. Creation of Form in the Browser 
Some tools create the forms in the POST requests in the browser 
during testing. This criteria is to check whether a particular tool 
creates the form in the browser.  Based on the testing carried out 
with the selected tools, we found that the CSRF tester tool devel-
oped by the OWASP is the most effective based on the criteria 
described in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of Tools for CSRF Testing 
Criteria CSRF 
HTML file 
Listen  
Proxy 
Auto Submit  
Form 
Form in the 
Browser Tools 
OWASP 
CSRF Tester 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Burp Suite Yes Yes No No 
OWASP 
ZAP 
No Yes No Yes 
Pinata Yes No Yes No 
 
Pinata and CSRF tester are tools, which can be used for the auto 
submission of the forms, but Pinata does not have the proxy listen-
ing functionality. Proxy listening is nearly a deciding factor in the 
testing process. The other two tools, Burp Suite and OWASP ZAP, 
are good tools, which can test for all vulnerabilities. However, 
they are not efficient as a CSRF tester tool because they cannot 
submit the forms automatically, even if they can perform the at-
tack by manually submitting the form. Since most of the attacks 
are targeted on the POST requests, the submission of the form 
should be done automatically in order to test it. Therefore, this is a 
big drawback in these two tools. Based on the comparison, it is 
evident that the OWASP CSRF tester is more effective than other 
tools because, contrary to other tools, it satisfies the three main 
criteria (refer to Table 1). 
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5. Criteria for Comparison of Solutions 
A comparison of CSRF solutions is made based on nine criteria, 
which are selected based on the literature. These criteria also de-
pend on the mechanism of different solutions. These criteria are 
discussed in detail below. 
5.1. Prevention against Get Requests 
This criterion checks whether the solution gives protection for 
requests, which use the GET method. GET is one of the four types 
of methods used in requests. It involves reading data from the 
server by sending a request. The comparison table (Table 2), 
shows which solutions provide protection against GET requests 
and which ones do not.  
5.2. Prevention against Post Requests 
POST is another of the four main methods used to retrieve data 
from the server. In a POST requests a form is submitted to the 
server requesting the data. Once the form is filled in and submitted, 
the server returns the result. The comparison table shows which 
solutions provide protection and which ones do not against POST 
requests.  
5.3. Prevention against Single Step Transactions 
Most sensitive data handling requests these days uses multi re-
quests. However, some web applications used single step or a 
single request for this kind of transactions in the past. This criteri-
on tests whether a solution protects a Web Application which uses 
a single step for sensitive operations from the CSRF attacks, alt-
hough, the use of single step requests for sensitive transactions is 
not recommended. 
5.4. Usage of Random Value in the Code 
Some of the solutions to prevent CSRF attacks deploy a pseudo 
random number for the implementation of the solution. Checking 
each solution against this criterion tests whether a particular solu-
tion uses a random number in the code itself or not.  
5.5. Usage of Random Value in the URL 
Passing the randomly generated token is one of the most effective 
solutions to protect a Web Application against CSRF attacks. 
Each solution in the comparison table is therefore checked so that 
solutions, which pass the pseudo random value through the URL, 
can be identified.  
5.6. Usage of Random Value in the Cookie 
The randomly generated token can also be passed with the cookie 
information. By checking each solution against this criterion, we 
can identify which solution uses this method. This is a potential 
solution even if all the information in the cookie is accessible to 
the attackers. 
5.7. Random Value Encryption 
The random value created using a pseudo random number genera-
tor can be encrypted and used as a preventive mechanism against 
the CSRF attacks. The solutions are checked against these criteria 
to understand whether they use the above mechanism to activate 
the protection. The encryption is normally done to deny the at-
tackers access to the random number. 
 
 
 
5.8. Browser Dependency 
There are existing ways to prevent CSRF attacks in Web applica-
tions which are dependent on the browser. However, an effective 
solution should not depend upon Brower’s capability to enhance 
its protection level. 
5.9. Domain Dependency 
The effective solutions to prevent a web application from the 
CSRF attacks should not be dependent on the domain. According 
to the literature, there are existing solutions which are dependent 
on the domain. This criteria is used to identify which solutions are 
dependent on a particular domain.  
6. Comparison of Solutions to Prevent CSRF 
Attacks 
A comparison of the CSRF solutions has been made, based on the 
criteria as listed in Table 2. This comparison helps us to under-
stand the efficiency of each solution to prevent the CSRF attacks.  
Passing a pseudo random token through the hidden field is consid-
ered the most efficient existing solution to prevent the CSRF at-
tacks in web applications. At the server end, this token is validated 
against the token in the session. If both the tokens match, then it is 
understood that the request originated from the same origin. By 
passing the token through the hidden field, access of the attackers 
to the token is denied [17]. 
In POST requests, along with the normal form, the token is in-
cluded as a hidden field [9]. Single step transactions are also pro-
tected, because the form submission automatically converts single 
step transactions into multistep transactions. 
Since the pseudo random value is passed through the hidden field, 
the token is in the code. The token is not present in the URL or in 
the cookie. The token remains unencrypted in this solution. An-
other advantage is that it is not dependent on the browser or on the 
domain because the solution is implemented in the Web Applica-
tion itself [11]. 
The second most effective solution is passing the unpredictable 
random token through the URL. This solution is mainly imple-
mented in GET requests but it can also give protection to POST 
requests. Even if the token is accessible to the attacker, it is not 
useful because the validity of the token expires when the session 
expires [11]. A new token is generated at the start of each session. 
Single step transactions are also protected because the token is 
validated on the server side with each request. The token is not 
present in the code and in the cookie but it is available in the URL. 
Similar to the solution discussed before, this one is also independ-
ent of the browser and the domain [7, 18]. Of the two methods 
discussed above, the former one, passing a pseudo random token 
through the hidden field, is more powerful and more widely used. 
Besides the above, checking the referrer header of a request is also 
a possible solution to prevent CSRF attacks. It helps to identify 
the origin of the request [19]. This is independent of the type of 
request. However, not all browsers have the option of sending the 
referrer header with each request. Even if the browser supports it, 
the option to turn off the referrer header is available. This means 
that this solution is dependent on the browser as well as the do-
main [20]. 
Submitting the cookie twice is simply placing the generated token 
in the cookie information itself and sending it. Since the cookie 
can be accessed by anyone, this solution does not provide proper 
protection. On the server side the value in the cookie is validated 
against the value in the session. The only advantage is that the 
solution is not dependent on the browser and the domain [7]. 
An effective method is encrypting the token which is generated 
randomly and passing it through the session. Rather than checking 
the token at the server side, the token is decrypted and compared 
with the generated token [21]. This is efficient but harder for the 
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developers as it requires coding to encrypt, decrypt and compare 
the token. Due to this difficulty, the process is seldom used. The 
advantage of only passing the encrypted token is Browser and 
Domain independence [7]. 
Similarly, the origin headers are also dependent on the browsers. 
Attaching the origin header with every request is a feature of the 
‘Firefox’ browser, which was developed by a research group com-
prising Adam Barth, Collin Jackson and John C. Mitchell [2]. 
None of the other browsers have this functionality. The process is 
therefore dependent on a particular browser. Since there is no 
generation of a token, there is no presence of a random value in 
the code or URL or the cookie [20]. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of the Solutions to Prevent CSRF Threat 
 
Criteria 
Protect 
GET 
requests 
Protect 
POST 
requests 
Protect 
single step 
operations 
Token in 
the code 
Token 
in the 
URL 
Token in 
the cookie 
Token 
Encryption 
Depends 
Browser 
Depends 
Domain Solution 
1 
Pseudorandom value 
(synchronizer token 
pattern) as a hidden 
field in the form 
Yes Yes Yes Yes X X X X X 
2 
Pseudorandom value 
(synchronizer token 
pattern) disclosed in 
the URL 
Yes Yes Yes X Yes X X X X 
3 
Using only post re-
quests in the applica-
tions 
Yes X X X X X X X X 
4 Multi step transactions Yes X Yes X X X X X X 
5 
Double submitting 
cookies 
X Yes Yes X X Yes X X X 
6 
Encrypted token pat-
tern 
Yes Yes Yes X X X Yes X X 
7 
Checking the referrer 
header 
Yes Yes Yes X X X X Yes Yes 
8 
Checking the origin 
header 
Yes Yes Yes X X X X Yes X 
9 
Challenge response 
(disadvantage: not 
user friendly) 
Yes Yes Yes X X X X X X 
 
Getting a response from the client by a challenge is one of the best 
ways to identify the origin of a request. In fact, it is a double au-
thentication procedure for a request to be processed. It is the only 
solution which gives proper protection against CSRF attacks 
without the use of pseudo random numbers [22]. However, the 
disadvantage is that asking for re-authentication in each and every 
request is uncomfortable for the user. User-friendliness is crucial 
for any good web application. This Browser independent tech-
nique is only implemented in requests which are highly sensitive, 
to give extra security in addition to the token validation [7]. 
7. Solution and Recommendations 
The proposed technique will present an effective solution, which 
can offer double-layered protection against CSRF. Figure 1 de-
picts the flowchart which demonstrates the general progression of 
the algorithm. 
The OWASP CSRF tester is used in this case as well to generating 
the html file to execute the attack. The test has been carried out 
using our own dedicated private cloud. The file used for attacking 
purposes will register a new user to the application from an exter-
nal source. An HTML file for the registration request using the 
CSRF tester tool has been generated. After that, the parameters of 
the form have been edited to convert it an attack file. The screen-
shot of this file is shown below (Figure 2). To ensure that the to-
ken is passed through both hidden field and the URL, please re-
view the highlighted section. The same token is displayed in the 
URL and in the hidden field in the form. 
Once the form was created using the tool, the parameters of the 
registration fields have been edited. If the attack executes success-
fully, a new user with username ‘34343’ will be created in the 
Web Application. To execute the attack, the file is accessed in the 
same browser as where a user is logged into the application. The 
result for the test is shown below. 
Once the attack is executed, the application rejected the request 
flagging a token error. This means that the token present in the 
attack file did not match the token in the session when the request 
was sent. As a result the execution of the attack was not successful 
and the user was not registered to the application. This shows that 
the solution provides protection to the application against CSRF 
attacks. With this suggested solution, even if the attacker gets 
access to the token in the URL, the attack will not be executed 
successfully because of the double validation (validated with the 
token in a hidden field and a token in the URL). 
The result will be the same if the attacker obtains the token in the 
hidden field. This suggested solution provides more protection for 
web applications than the existing solutions.  
8. Conclusion  
CSRF attacks are riskier than they first appear to be because most 
web developers are unaware of CSRF and fail to provide proper 
protection. These attacks can be easily executed by the attackers 
by using straightforward techniques. A reliable mechanism for 
protecting a Web Application against these attacks is absolutely 
essential. There are many existing solutions which can be imple-
mented in a Web Application to prevent CSRF attacks. Of these, 
passing an unpredictable token through a hidden field and validat-
ing it at the server side is the most effective solution. Passing the 
token through the URL is the next best solution. Ongoing research 
is currently carried out to develop even more stringent methods to 
foil the CSRF attacks. The suggested solution is a combination of 
the most effective existing technique and the second best option. 
By implementing this, a double validation takes place at the server 
side of the web application to ensure the prevention of CSRF at-
tacks. 
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Fig. 1: Flowchart of the proposed process 
 
 
Fig. 2: Screenshot of the attack file created using CSRF Tester [7]. 
 
Currently, hackers do not seem to have devised a method to obtain 
the unpredictable token in the URL yet. However, if the attackers 
find a way to get this token in the future the suggested solution 
can be still used to prevent the attacks. Even if the attackers can 
get the token in the URL, they will not be aware of the token in 
the hidden field. Since the token is validated twice at server side, 
the attack request will be rejected.  Contrary to other existing solu-
tions, this solution provides protection against both GET requests 
and POST requests. The fact that the token passes through the 
code and the URL makes it preferable as well. Since the imple-
mentation of the solution is done in the Web Application, it is also 
independent of the browser. Considering all these properties, it 
would be expected that the suggested solution would be more 
effective to protect Web Applications from CSRF attacks than the 
existing solutions. 
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